German Economic Team

IPM Research Center

Policy Paper Series [PP/07/2009]

Perspectives for fiscal policy and budget deficit financing in Belarus

Gleb Shymanovich, Robert Kirchner, Ricardo Giucci

Berlin/Minsk, November 2009

About the IPM Research Center

The IPM Research Center was established in 1999 within the mutual project of the Institute for Privatization and Management (Minsk, Belarus) and CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research Foundation (Warsaw, Poland). It is a member of the CASE research network, William Davidson Institute NGO Alliance, and Economic Policy Institutes Network (project of the UNDP's Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS). The IPM Research Center actively cooperates with the German Economic Team in Belarus (GET Belarus). Within this cooperation the IPM Research Center provides independent policy advice on economic issues to the different official agencies, namely to the Council of Ministers, National Bank, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance and other organizations involved in the process of formation and implementation of economic policy.

The Mission of the IPM Research Center is to enhance national competitiveness through elaboration of the research-based economic policy recommendation and the promotion of professional dialogue on the urgent issues related to economic performance.

IPM Research Center
50B Zaharova Street, 220088, Minsk, Belarus
Tel: +375 (17) 2 100 105
Fax: +375 (17) 2 100 105
E-Mail: research@research.by
http://www.research.by

About the German Economic Team in Belarus (GET Belarus)

The main purpose of GET Belarus is to conduct a dialogue on economic policy issues with the government, civil society, and international organizations. Experts of German Economic Team have experience in policy advice in several transition economies, including Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. In Belarus the IPM Research Center and the German Economic Team provide information and analytical support to the Council of Ministers, the National Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and other institutions involved in the process of formation and implementation of economic policy.

German Economic Team
c/o Berlin Economics
Schillerstr. 59
D-10627 Berlin
Tel: +49 30 / 20 61 34 64 0
Fax: +49 30 / 20 61 34 64 9
E-Mail: info@get-belarus.de
http://www.get-belarus.de

Perspectives for fiscal policy and budget deficit financing in Belarus

Executive Summary

Belarus has a tradition of conducting solid fiscal policies. To take an example, in 2008 the budget featured a surplus of 1.4% of GDP and at the end of 2008 total public debt amounted to 13% of GDP, which is a very modest level in international comparison. However, the arrival of the international financial crisis and the resulting economic downturn in Belarus at the end of 2008 creates great challenges to fiscal policy and debt management. As a result of the crisis, Belarus is likely to run sizeable budgets deficits and pile up public debt in the coming years. Obviously, a continuation of "business as usual" is not feasible. Instead, the country has to adapt to the new fiscal reality and formulate an adequate policy response to deal with the new situation.

In our view, the response should consist of two parts. Regarding fiscal policy, it is of crucial importance to act soon with the aim of minimising future budget deficits. In such a way, Belarus can avoid creating structural deficits, which would prevail for many years and thus contribute to a sizeable and problematic increase in public debt. In order to restrict budget deficits, tough decision are needed, in particular concerning the subsidisation of agriculture, housing and communal services and state enterprises.

However, it is unlikely that Belarus will completely eliminate budget deficits in coming years. Thus, the question of how to finance budget deficits arises at a time, in which international financial markets are in dire straits. Without doubt, the best way to finance deficits in the short term is by selling state enterprises (i.e. privatisation), since this avoids piling up debt and contributes to implementing structural reforms. With regard to public debt, risk management should be of paramount importance. Due to the high roll-over risk of short-term debt, the authorities should continue to put emphasis on raising long-term debt. Since bilateral and multilateral development banks and agencies provide good opportunities for raising long-term capital at favourable conditions, Belarus should intensify the work with them. Furthermore, the public sector should avoid relying too narrowly on foreign currency debt, since this would entail serious currency risks, as became evident during the current crisis in many transition economies. Thus, in our view there is no alternative to developing a domestic capital market in Belarus, in which the government (and later corporates) issue debt in domestic currency.

Authors

Gleb Shymanovich	shymanovich@research.by	
Robert Kirchner	kirchner@berlin-economics.com	+49 30 / 206 134 642
Ricardo Giucci	giucci@berlin-economics.com	+49 30 / 206 134 641

Contents

1. Introduction

Over the last years, Belarus' public finances were in very good shape. Over 2006–2008, the country ran budget surpluses in each single year, and the level of public debt was correspondingly rather low by international comparison. At the end of 2008, the stock of public debt amounted to only 13% of GDP.

However, from 2009 onwards, this benign picture has deteriorated rapidly. Significant budget deficits are to be expected in the aftermath of the international economic crisis. In 2009, the consolidated budget is forecast to show a deficit of 1.5%, a big change compared to the surplus of 1.4% recorded in 2008. The need to finance such deficits arises automatically, despite still severe problems at international capital markets. But also the level of public debt will be severely affected by the crisis. A significant increase in public debt is likely, partly due to these budget deficits, but also because of the devaluation of Belarusian ruble, since a large share of the debt is denominated in foreign currency.

It is obvious that a completely new situation has emerged since 2009, for which policy makers need to find adequate responses. This paper tries to address this simple, nevertheless central question: How should the government deal with the new situation, and how does an adequate policy response look like?

The paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2, we discuss recent developments regarding fiscal policy in Belarus. Chapter 3 describes the corresponding developments with respect to the level and structure of public debt in Belarus. In chapter 4, we discuss the perspectives for fiscal policy and formulate policy recommendations. Chapter 5 provides policy recommendations for budget deficit financing. In the last chapter we conclude.

2. Recent developments in fiscal policy in Belarus

Belarus enjoyed a favorable economic environment during the last 5 years which allowed the government to finance lavish state programs without facing problems of budget deficit. Apart from the current year, the general government budget was run with a deficit only in 2005 in the reported period, as Figure 1 shows:

Figure 1: General budget balance (% of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Finance.

The global economic crisis took a heavy toll on Belarus' economy in 2009, leading to a sharp contraction in exports. It resulted in either a direct reduction of output, or an indirect one in the form of growing inventories. In terms of the general budget, it meant a reduction of the tax income. First of all, there was a fall in

- Revenue on profits taxation,

– Value-added tax revenues, caused also by import reduction, and
– Export duties revenues due to falling oil and potash prices.

The authorities reacted to this situation by cutting expenditures, especially public investment, where many projects were cancelled or postponed. A tight fiscal stance plays indeed the central role in the economic policy mix of the government, which has the objective to facilitate adjustment and stabilise the economy. At the same time, the political will to preserve public expenditures on social issues and real sector needs, including agriculture, on the level of the previous years thus sustaining domestic consumption, boiled down to a deficit of 2.6% of GDP by July 2009. Taking into account the seasonality of public finances and traditionally growing expenditures at the 4th quarter, one can predict a substantial general government deficit by the end of 2009. As Belarus will hardly overcome the crisis within the next year[1] the problem of financing budget deficit will become only more acute.

3. Recent developments in public debt in Belarus

These developments highlight the growing importance of public debt management issues. The volume of Belarus public debt was generally stable until 2007. The nominal growth rates were lower or comparable to the nominal GDP growth, which resulted in the slight reduction of public debt, measured in percent of GDP. In 2006, public debt and debt guaranteed by the government amounted to 8.8% of GDP (compared to 10.4% of GDP in 2003, see Figure 2). Starting from 2007 Belarus attracted long-term loans from multilateral and bilateral official sources. Belarus was granted two Russian loans of USD 1.5 bn – the first one in the end of 2007 and the second one in two tranches in November 2008 and March 2009. Besides, IMF provided Belarus a loan on a Stand-By Arrangement. By the second quarter of 2009, Belarus got two tranches of this loan of USD 778 m in January and 679 m in June of 2009[2]. The expected total amount of the loan is USD 3.63 bn. As a result of these new loans, public debt reached 18.2% of GDP or USD 8.6 bn by the middle of 2009.

Figure 2: Dynamics of public debt



Note. GDP for June 2009 was calculated as a sum of the last 12 months (i.e. trailing GDP).
Source: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Statistics.

In the structure of public debt and debt guaranteed by the government regarding the origin of lender, the domestic debt prevailed. Its share was steadily growing until 2007 reaching 74.2% in 2006 (Figure 3). However, Russian, Venezuela and IMF loans reversed the structure of public

[1] See possible scenarios in Kruk, D., Chubrik, A. (2009). Perspectives and Challenges for Economic Policy in Belarus During the Global Crisis: Evidence from Macroeconometric Modelling, *Policy paper* PP/04/09.

[2] A third tranche of USD 700 m was approved recently in October 2009, bringing total disbursements so far to USD 2.23 bn.

debt: currently 63.1% of public debt is attributed to the external borrowings. Due to these loans the level of external public debt has reached 10.0% of GDP (or USD 5.6 bn). In Belarus, external debt is in foreign currency only, while domestic debt is in both local and foreign currency. There is a lack of trust in the national currency, which is why the government has to borrow even on the domestic market in USD and EUR. Besides, to attract investors to securities issued in BYR, government has to use floating rates to insure them against the inflation risk.

Figure 3: Public debt structure



Source: Ministry of Finance.

Regarding the maturity of debt, Belarus' public debt is mainly long-term. There is no short-term external public debt, as it is constituted by long-term bilateral and IMF loans. The share of short-term debt in domestic debt has also fallen since 2006, when it amounted to 29.9% of the domestic debt (see Figure 4) to less then 1% in June 2009. Its fall was caused by the reduction of the short-term government securities (SGS) emission that account for almost all short-term public debt. The volume of outstanding SGS shrank from 1.6% of GDP in 2006 to 0.04% in June of 2009 (see Figure 5). Reduction of the short-term domestic public debt was accompanied by steady growth of the volume of the long-term government securities (LGS) – main contributor to the domestic long-term debt. Since 2006 the volume of outstanding LGS soared from 2.5% of GDP to 3.6%.

Figure 4: Public domestic debt maturity structure

Note. Short-term debt is defined as a sum of debt obligations with the original maturity less than 12 months.
Source: Ministry of Finance.

Figure 5: Outstanding public debt securities (volume and interest rates)



Source: National Bank of Belarus.

Main contributors to Belarus' public debt are multilateral and bilateral loans and long-term government securities. They account for around 95% of current public debt. This makes public finances vulnerable to future changes in the interest rates of these debt instruments and exchange rates of the currencies of borrowing. The bilateral loans from Russia were attracted in USD, making the costs of servicing this loan heavily dependent on exchange rate dynamics. Interest rates of the Russian loans were set at a spread of 75 and 350 basis points over LIBOR. However, the rates of these loans are very privileged, thus making the risks of floating rather insignificant[3]. Besides, half of the LGS are also issued in foreign currency (see Figure 6), stressing the problem of "original sin" for Belarus. Moreover, the interest rates of the securities issued in BYR are mainly floating, set as a spread over the refinancing rate, a fact that makes Belarusian public debt exposed to the risks of high inflation.

Figure 6: Structure regarding the currency of borrowing of LGS (as of 1 August 2009)



Source: Ministry of Finance.

[3] The IMF loan is also in foreign currency (special drawing rights, SDR), and the interest rate is set as a spread over the SDR rate.

Belarus has not yet issued Eurobonds in international capital markets, which can become in the future another significant instrument for public debt issuance. Earlier on, Belarus declared plans of issuing these securities and received in 2007 two sovereign ratings from Moody's and Standard and Poor's (S&P). Initially, S&P assigned Belarus a "B+" rating (in foreign currency) in August 2007 and affirmed it several times later on. Moody's assigned a "B1" rating for government bonds. The ratings represented an adequate risk level for investing in Belarus. However, they would have allowed attracting funds only at quite high interest rates, with demand coming mainly from speculative funds, rather then from investment ones. That was partly a reason why Belarus did not enter the international debt market at that time. The crisis did not affect the sovereign ratings, but it led to the deterioration of the outlook to "negative" by S&P in November 2008. It does not promise much prospects for borrowing in international markets in the near future, if there was such a desire.

4. Perspectives for fiscal policy

Belarus fiscal policy was operating under favourable economic conditions. In this environment, a complicated tax system with relatively high tax rates allowed generating huge revenues, exceeding 50% of GDP. This enormous tax burden, however, happened not to undermine economic growth. The funds were channelled back into the economy via direct subsidies or loans provided by state banks on privileged terms. Subsidies to loss-making enterprises encompassed also hidden social transfers, as they were targeted at sustaining jobs and minimising unemployment.

The global financial crisis shook the fundamentals of Belarus' economic growth. The following contraction of tax revenues led to a steadily growing budget deficit, as the government was deemed to maintain subsidies to enterprises in order to prevent the emergence of a social crisis. The later was hardly avoidable due to the fact that if state enterprises go bankrupt, there is no social protection for the unemployed. The current deficit and the forthcoming expected budget deficits (see Figure 7) stress the importance of reformation of fiscal policy in a way it would be able to meet the challenge of growing fiscal deficit.

Figure 7: General budget balance forecast (% of GDP)



Note. A= Actual; E=Estimate; F= Forecast

Source: Ministry of Finance for 2008–2010, IMF for 2011–2013.

Running a budget deficit in the conditions of the global economic turmoil is complicated by shrinking opportunities to attract necessary sources to finance the deficit. There is a lack of liquidity on international financial markets, and investors are seeking safe havens, thus avoiding investing in public debt instruments of countries with a high level of risk. Currently, Belarus does not have a possibility to issue international debt securities on terms acceptable for the government.

Another important issue is that the fiscal deficit is accompanied by a sizable current account deficit[4], which should be actually a prime target variable for an anti-crisis economic policy. According to simple national accounting relationships, a growing fiscal deficit is related to a current account deficit increase.[5] High public expenditures or cuts in taxes lead to a growth in consumption both of domestic and imported goods and services. At the same time, a growing fiscal deficit boils down to the reduction of savings. In turn, it means either a reduction of investments, or their financing from external sources. The empirical economic literature is not able to fully prove this concept, but it largely agrees that there is negative influence of the fiscal deficit on the current account deficit, the intensity of which differs from country's specific circumstances. In case of Belarus, this interrelation can not be neglected, as imports in 2009 have been mainly fuelled by high public expenditures. They have allowed enterprises to continue importing intermediate goods, while their final products that have been accumulated as inventories.

Belarus is now facing the challenge how to minimise the fiscal deficit. As the tax burden is already very high, there is no room for raising additional tax revenues, even though reforms should address the structure of the tax system, which should be improved. Hence, the fiscal authorities have to focus on reviewing the expenditure side of the budget, trying to implement a prudent fiscal policy. The following public expenditures may be revised:

– Subsidies to the real economy: Restructuring of the public owned enterprises, including their privatization, should significantly decrease these expenditures. However, current subsidies to the enterprises should be partly viewed as social transfers. They keep employment at tremendous high levels, disregarding the low productivity of this excessive labour force. So, a restructuring of enterprises will be accompanied by unemployment growth, and additional direct expenditures on social security of unemployed are inevitable. For example, unemployment benefit has been proposed to be increased from current 20% of subsistence minimum to 100%.

– Expenditures on housing and communal services: Payments by the population currently cover only 30% of the hosing service costs and this share is not growing despite official statements that it will reach 100% by 2015. The increase of this ratio is actually not the only way of cutting public expenditures. Even more essential is the modernisation of electricity and heating systems, as they are dramatically lacking efficiency[6]. Public-private partnerships in this field may also contribute to the reduction of the subsidies to housing and communal sector[7].

– Agriculture: Direct public support to this sector reached in 2008 3.5% of GDP, while the share of agriculture in GDP was actually only 8.4%. Subsidies to the agriculture are very broad and they prove not to be efficient, as the majority of Belarusian farms remain uncompetitive, despite the permanent inflow of financial sources from the budget[8]. Room for improvement lies in better targeting of the financial support, assuming that only those farms who can raise their competitiveness are eligible for it.

---

[4] The presence of current account and fiscal deficits simultaneously is known as 'twin deficits'.

[5] GDP can be represented by the following national accounting identities Y=C+I+G+X-M and Y=C+S+T. The current account deficit can be then expressed as (M-X) = (G-T) + (I-S), where Y – GDP, C – private consumption, G – public consumption, X – exports, M – imports, S – savings, T – taxes. (G-T) represents the fiscal deficit, which is positively related to the current account deficit.

[6] See Zachmann, G., Zaborovskiy, A., Giucci, R. (2008). Restructuring the Belarusian Electricity Sector: Setting the Agenda. Policy paper PP/05/08. Rakova, E., Tochitskaya, I. (Eds.) (2006). *Энергетика Беларуси: пути развития (Belarus energy sector: Development trends)*, IPM research center.

[7] See Tochitskaya, I. (2007). Public-private partnership. *Policy paper* PP/01/07.

[8] See von Cramon-Taubadel, S. (2009). Landwirtschaft in Belarus: Der ökonomische Druck auf Reformen wächst. Newsletter 02/2009 of GET Belarus (http://get-belarus.de/download/Newsletter/2009 /Newsletter_02_2009%20GET%20Belarus.pdf

- Subsidies to the real sector should be allocated directly from a special public agency and not via banks, as it was also recommended by the IMF. It will make the process more transparent and accountable. Currently, banks are obliged to provide loans on privileged terms, suffering losses that are then compensated from the budget.

5. Perspectives for budget deficit financing

Implementation of the measures aimed at decreasing the budget expenditures will, however, hardly allow avoiding budget deficit in the short and medium run, as crisis will demand mounting expenditures on the social policy issues. Thus, perspectives for budget deficit financing are of crucial importance.

The main source of budget deficit financing may become privatisation receipts. Until now, Belarus has not run massive privatisation, as it has been done in other post-socialist countries. Starting from 2007, Belarus has been persuading a policy of selective privatisation that is targeted at attracting foreign currency, necessary to finance the current account deficit. Privatisation deals have been occurring mainly in the following economic sectors: banking, telecommunications, food processing (e.g. breweries) and the energy sector[9]. Besides, there is a plan of privatisation for 2008–2010, set by the Presidential Decree #7 from 14 April 2008, which assumes corporatisation of 519 enterprises and the following privatisation of 147 from them. Implementation of this plan has not yet transformed in any prominent privatisation deals. Some progress is anticipated due to the IMF Stand-By Program that demands the open and transparent privatisation of 5 enterprises in 2010.

Privatisation has potentially double effects, as it reduces public expenditures on the real economy and provides revenues for budget deficit financing. However, in the current turbulent economic environment there are only marginal possibilities to raise decent revenues from selling assets in Belarus. The attractive deals may occur only in sectors not hit severely by the crisis – once again energy, telecommunication sector and food processing. In other sectors, they may have a form of pre-privatisation deals[10]. Despite the global economic turmoil, privatisation should not be postponed as it brings new technologies and management skills to the country, thus accelerating structural reforms, badly needed to fight the current account deficit in the medium and long-run.

The other source for budget deficit financing is raising capital at domestic markets by issuing public debt securities. It implies the development of a domestic market for sovereign bonds that nowadays is quite restrained. The key issue here is the attractiveness of government bonds to investors, both domestic and foreign. The crisis, a growing current account deficit and the devaluation of the BYR let investors doubt over the future stability of the national currency. They would prefer to invest in bonds denominated in USD or EUR, or tied to the exchange rate of BYR, thus insuring themselves against the risk of inflation and devaluation. From the government side, this should be an unwelcome scenario for several reasons:

- Many past emerging markets debt crisis were caused by the prevalence of domestic sovereign bonds denominated in USD in the public debt structure. Despite being domestic, these securities perform like external debt and inherit the currency mismatch problem. This emerges due to the inability to borrow in local currency, in which public revenues are nominated, while the debt should be served in foreign currency. It leads to a high currency risk, as any depreciation of the local currency leads to the growth of the external debt to be served;
- As a consequence, the government is interested in a strong or even appreciating domestic currency and may interfere in the monetary and exchange rate policy. Such institutional

[9] Rakova, E. (2009). Приватизация как способ финансирования дефицита торгового баланса: возможности для Беларуси [Privatization as a source of current account deficit financing: Possibilities for belarus], *IPM Research center Working paper* WP/08/09.
[10] For detailed discussion see Kirchner, R., Giucci, R. (2009). Privatisation in Belarus during the global financial crisis: No time to lose, Policy paper/02/09.

problems are leading to inappropriate economic policy solutions, hampering long-term growth, accumulating risks and undermining trust in the central bank as an independent institution;

– It contradicts the postulated de-dollarisation policy and limits the possibilities of independence from developments in external fiscal and monetary policies.

To sum up, the only remaining policy option is to issue sovereign bonds in BYR, even though it will require high interest rates at the beginning. Moreover, these rates may have to be floating (as they are largely now, see Figure 6) set as a spread over the refinance rate, thus minimising possible government revenue from the "inflation tax"[11].

Besides, the development of a sovereign debt securities market has positive effects in the long run. First, it will provide in the future an alternative for borrowing abroad in foreign currency, which is very risky, as shown by the experience of many transition countries during financial crises. Second, it can serve as a benchmark for private capital market. A liquid domestic sovereign debt market may encourage private companies to issue debt securities, which is an alternative to bank loans, the only available way of raising funds nowadays in Belarus. Third, the bonds may attract non-resident investors, thus stimulating inflows in the capital account of the balance of payments, which is crucial to finance the current account deficit.

Public debt issuance as a source of financing the fiscal deficit has some restrictions too. First of all, local financial sources are scarce, and the issuance of a significant amount of domestic debt securities may have a crowding out affect, undermining local investments. Besides, it is assumed that private financial funds will be allocated to the public sector in this case, i.e. there will be a transfer of assets to an obviously less efficient manager, which can negatively influence long-term economic growth. Second, possibilities to accumulate public debt in the form of bilateral and multilateral loans is limited due to the amount of loans already attracted from Russia and the IMF to finance the current account deficit. Ever growing public debt can put additional pressure on the financial system, as costs of its servicing will obviously exceed the current level of 1% of GDP and will demand a further reduction of public expenditures, as the primary fiscal balance will deteriorate.

5. Conclusion

Belarus is clearly facing a new situation in respect to the conduct of fiscal policy. If no action is taken soon, there is a risk of high budget deficits and a correspondent increase in public debt in the near future, which raises the question of debt sustainability. Thus, fiscal policies should search for possibilities for reducing future budget deficits by balancing the budget. In our view, there is little room on the revenue side of the budget: The fiscal burden of the economy is already very high and increasing taxes would create strong disincentives for production and economic activity. Consequently, the focus should be in cutting public expenditure. In this respect we suggest looking carefully at possibilities to reduce subsidies to agriculture, housing and communal services as well as to several state enterprises.

Regarding the financing of budget deficits, we highlight once again[12] the need for a revitalisation of the privatisation process. Furthermore, the typical "mistakes" of other transition economies concerning the maturity and the currency of state debt should not be repeated, mistakes that became obvious only after the current crisis hit these countries. As clearly shown during the current crisis, relying too heavily on short-term debt in foreign currency is too risky, as this raises roll-over risks and increases debt servicing costs measured in local currency in case of a devaluation. Belarus should instead look for long-term debt and/or debt in local currency, even if this may imply paying higher interest rates in the short-term.

[11] The positive consequence is reducing incentives for the government to run high inflation, which is devastating for the macroeconomic environment.

[12] See our policy paper PP/02/2009 for a thorough discussion on the prospects of privatisation in Belarus.

List of Recent Policy Papers

- Perspectives and Challenges for Economic Policy in Belarus During the Global Crisis: Evidence from Macroeconometric Modelling, PP/04/2009
- The Belarusian Electricity Sector: Financing Sources for Investments, PP/03/2009
- Privatisation in Belarus during the Global Financial Crisis: No Time to Lose, PP/02/2009
- The Belarusian Insurance Market Characteristics in the Context of Economic Liberalization: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, PP/01/2009
- Recent Developments and Impact of the International Financial Crisis on Belarus, PP/08/2008.
- Impact of FDI on Trade and Technology Transfer in Belarus: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, PP/07/2008.
- Reinsurance Practices in Belarus: Barriers to Insurance Sector Development and Investments Limitation, PP/06/2008.
- Restructuring the Belarusian Electricity Sector: Setting the Agenda, by Zachmann, G. and Zaborovskiy, PP/05/2008.
- The case for tariff differentiation in the Belarusian electricity sector, by Zachmann, G. and Zaborovskiy, PP/04/2008, October 2008.
- The International Financial Crisis and Belarus: Risks and Policy Implications, by Kruk, D., Kirchner, R. and Giucci, R., PP/03/2008, August 2008.
- Pension System in Belarus: Major Challenges and the Ways of Meeting Them, by Haiduk, K., Chubrik, A. and Giucci, R., PP/01/2008, June 2008.
- Quasi-Fiscal Activity in the Energy Sector in Belarus, by Tochitskaya, I., PP/08/2007, December 2007.
- Adopting Inflation Targeting: Operational Framework for Belarus, by Kruk, D., Kirchner, R., PP/07/2007, December 2007.
- Adopting Inflation Targeting: Overview of Economic Preconditions and Institutional Requirements, by Kirchner, R., Kruk, D., PP/06/2007, December 2007.
- Student Loans: An Effective Instrument for Financing Higher Education, by Schumann, Ch., Giucci, R., PP/05/2007, December 2007.
- Regulatory barriers for SMEs in Belarus: The Role of Price Regulation, by Glambotskaya, A., Rakova, E., PP/04/2007, October 2007.
- Raising Funds at Western Capital Markets: Opportunities for Belarusian Companies, by Haiduk, K., Giucci, R., PP/03/2007, October 2007.
- Energy Shocks and Macroeconomic Management: Policy Options for Belarus, by Giucci, R., Kirchner, R., PP/02/2007, July 2007.
- Public Private Partnership, by Tochitskaya, I., PP/01/2007, July 2007.